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I British Corps and the Battle of 
the Scheldt
A Reassessment 
N I C H O L A S  W H E E L E R
Abstract : This paper will demonstrate that I British Corps’ operations 
were critical to the opening of the port of Antwerp. By examining the 
impact that I British Corps had on the operational and strategic levels of 
command within Twenty-First Army Group, it challenges the narrative 
that their operations were supporting in nature. Anchoring the centre 
of a three corps operation designed to open the port of Antwerp, clear 
the Scheldt Estuary, and push German forces out of southern Holland, 
I British Corps faced the bulk of Fifteenth Army and was decisive in 
undermining its strategic concept of operations. In fact, I British Corps’ 
actions ensured the operational success of 2nd Canadian Division and 
the strategic success of First Canadian Army and Twenty-First Army 
Group.
The baTTle of The scheldT is well known within Canadian military history. II Canadian Corps, under the temporary 
command of Major-General Charles Foulkes, fought a bloody battle in 
the Breskens Pocket, South Beveland, and Walcheren Island between 
September and November 1944. Firsthand accounts of the battle, war 
diaries, and official reports describe horrific conditions, a determined 
German enemy, and appalling numbers of casualties. In this respect, 
II Canadian Corps’ story dominates the historiography of the Scheldt 
and Antwerp. There is, however, another aspect of this story that has 
long been neglected. Lieutenant-General Sir John Crocker’s I British 
Corps played an important role in the Battle of the Scheldt.
I British Corps, a multi-national formation composed of divisions 
from Canada, Britain, the United States, and Poland, anchored the 
© Canadian Military History 2019
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right wing of First Canadian Army. From this position, Crocker 
was tasked with opening Antwerp and protecting the left flank of 
Second British Army as it continued its push towards Germany. The 
Corps’ operations were profoundly influenced by the ongoing strategic 
debate between the Supreme Allied Commander, General Dwight 
Eisenhower, who favoured a broad-front advance into Germany, 
and the Commander of Twenty-First Army Group, Field Marshal 
Bernard Montgomery, who advocated a narrow thrust. The resulting 
ambiguity in directives to Crocker put him in a unique position to 
have a considerable influence on the operational and strategic outcome 
of the Battle of the Scheldt. A re-examination of the primary and 
secondary sources indicates that I British Corps played a much larger 
role in the opening of Antwerp and the defeat of Fifteenth Army than 
previously recognized.
This paper will demonstrate that I British Corps’ operations 
were critical to the success of Allied operations to open the port of 
Antwerp. A reassessment of I British Corps’ operations challenges 
the marginalized nature of its role in the battle. In exploring the 
relationship between I and XII British Corps, this paper will 
dissect Montgomery’s 16 October directive and examine how his 
strategic direction should have translated into operational action in 
contrast to how operations unfolded. By assessing this strategic and 
operational disconnect, and the influence Montgomery had on XII 
British Corps’ operations, it will demonstrate that I British Corps 
assumed a much larger operational and strategic role in the battle 
than previously recognized.
This paper also assesses the impact of I British Corps’ operations 
in relation to 2nd Canadian Division’s efforts to isolate the South 
Beveland isthmus. Initially, this analysis will focus on the strategic 
direction issued by Montgomery prior to 16 October, arguing that 
the continued disconnect between Montgomery’s strategic direction 
and intent prevented 2nd Canadian Division from accomplishing the 
operational task of securing the South Beveland isthmus. As a result, 
First Canadian Army was unable to clear the Scheldt Estuary. It will 
then examine the relationship between 2nd Canadian Division and I 
British Corps post-16 October. Crocker’s efforts to secure the northern 
and eastern flanks of 2nd Canadian Division subsequently resulted in 
the isolation of the South Beveland isthmus and the operational and 
strategic successes of First Canadian Army and Twenty-First Army 
Group.
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While the Battle of the Scheldt has a lengthy historiography, 
I British Corps’ operations during the Scheldt campaign are 
neglected within the literature. One would assume that the analysis 
of a strategically critical battle such as the opening of the port of 
Antwerp would be comprehensive. However, several factors have 
led to I British Corps’ role in this operation being marginalized or 
misunderstood. This in turn has led to an inaccurate assessment of 
the importance of the Corps during this period. In fact, the narrative 
surrounding I British Corps operations has evolved from early 
assessments of their extreme importance, to a later characterization 
as only supporting in nature.
Why has I British Corps role in the opening of Antwerp been 
downgraded and, more generally, neglected? The earliest accounts 
of the Battle of the Scheldt consist of Twenty-First Army Group’s 
report completed shortly after the end of the war in Europe and 
two Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) reports compiled in 
1946 and 1948. These three reports provide little with respect to I 
British Corps’ operations, and primarily focus on the overarching 
Lieutenant General J. T. Crocker, commander of I British Corps. [© IWM (TR 2169)]
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strategic situation and II Canadian Corps’ operations.1 In the case 
of the CMHQ report, the author, W.E.C. Harrison, was likely trying 
to provide a general overview of the Scheldt operation to be included 
within C.P. Stacey’s, official historian of the Canadian Army, 
forthcoming official history instead of a comprehensive account of the 
battle. While Harrison does describe I British Corps’ operations as 
“extremely important,” the text is mostly descriptive in nature, with 
the role of I British Corps being peripheral to the main focus of the 
work—II Canadian Corps. 
The focus on the Canadian narrative continued in Stacey’s the 
Victory Campaign in 1960. The production of the three-volume 
Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War 
was constrained by a desire to publish them shortly after the end of 
the conflict and in a format that appealed to the general reader.2 As 
a result, Stacey only briefly recounts the story of I British Corps. 
Operations from 16 to 29 October are related in a single paragraph 
while those between 30 October and 8 November are restricted to 
half a page.3 A likely explanation for I British Corps’ operations being 
largely overlooked is that they simply did not meet the requirements 
outlined by Stacey for their incorporation into the official history.4 
It is not surprising then, that a multi-national British Corps, in the 
“Cinderella Army” of Twenty-First Army Group, did not receive more 
attention within a Canadian official history. Considering Stacey’s 
intent, a microscopic focus on a British Corps fighting with the First 
Canadian Army would have seemed out of place. 
1  21st Army Group, Clearing of the Scheldt Estuary: Oct-Nov 1944, 1944, 
Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, 3. http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/
cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll8/id/2615/rec/2 accessed 18 July 2017.; W.E.C. 
Harrison, CMHQ Report #154: Clearing the Scheldt Estuary and Opening the Port 
of Antwerp: Operations of First Canadian Army in NorthWest Europe, 1 Oct. - 8 
Nov. 44 (Preliminary Report), May 5, 1946, Directorate of History and Heritage 
(DHH), 5-7; W.E.C. Harrison, CMHQ Report #188: Canadian Participation in the 
Operations in North-West Europe, 1944. Part VI: Canadian Operation, 1 Oct. - 8 
Nov. The Clearing of the Scheldt Estuary, April 7, 1948, DHH, 88.
2  Roger Sarty, “The Origins of Academic Military History in Canada, 1940-1967,” 
Canadian Military History 23, 2 (2015): 8,10. 
3  Charles Perry Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second 
World War, Vol. III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North-West Europe 
1944-1945 (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 390, 
424.
4  Ibid., xiii.
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Stacey’s limited account of I British Corps has had unintended 
consequences on the scholarly examination of First Canadian Army 
operations during October and November 1944. British, American, 
and German official histories pay little attention to I British Corps 
in favour of more strategically important operations. Consequently, I 
British Corps is perceived as something distant and peripheral to the 
Scheldt campaign.  Since Stacey’s official histories were considered 
the definitive account of the Canadian Army during the Second World 
War until as late as the 1980s, the academic analysis of I British 
Corps during this period is very limited.5 Copp’s analysis of I British 
Corps in relation to Twenty-First Army Group can be considered the 
only academic work that has been written on this subject to date.6 
Unfortunately, the absence of academic analysis has allowed memoirs 
and popular histories to define I British Corps’ role in the battle.
Depending on the source, either a British or Canadian narrative 
is ever present throughout memoirs and popular histories. From a 
Canadian perspective, excellent examples are the works of Denis 
Whitaker and Mark Zuehlke. II Canadian Corps is at the forefront of 
their narratives of the Battle of the Scheldt while I British Corps and its 
units are relegated to a secondary role. The works of R.W. Thompson 
and J.L. Moulton insert a British narrative into the battle, but not to 
the benefit of I British Corps. Their accounts focus on the participation 
of other British units, examining operations within the Scheldt proper, 
with only a cursory analysis of I British Corps’ operations.
The consistent reduction of I British Corps within the literature 
has generated the belief that Crocker’s forces played nothing more 
than a supporting role. Douglas Delaney has argued, “Large and 
successful though the operation may have been, it was still only a 
supporting action to protect the right flank of the First Canadian 
Army as it struggled to clear the Scheldt Estuary.”7 Harrison would 
have likely been surprised at this evaluation of I British Corps’ role 
in operations north of Antwerp.
The reality is that I British Corps played a significant part in 
the strategic and operational success of Twenty-First Army Group. 
5  Tim Cook, Clio’s Warriors: Canadian Historians and the Writing of the World 
Wars (Toronto: University of British Columbia Press, 2016), 162.
6  Terry Copp, Cinderella Army: The Canadians in Northwest Europe 1944-1945 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 122-173.
7  Douglas Delaney, Corps Commanders: Five British and Canadian Generals at 
War, 1939-1945 (Toronto: University of British Columbia Press, 2011), 167.
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Anchored in the centre of Montgomery’s three-corps operation, I British 
Corps faced the bulk of the German Fifteenth Army commanded by 
Gustav von Zangen. From this central position, Crocker was in a 
unique position to determine the operational success of II Canadian 
Corps and the strategic success of Twenty-First Army Group. As I 
British Corps began operations to clear German forces south of the 
River Maas, the lack of a clear operational plan by Montgomery 
forced I British Corps to take the leading role in the defeat of 
Fifteenth Army. The existential threat posed by Crocker’s formation 
forced Fifteenth Army to reinforce LXVII Corps at the expense of 
LXXXVIII Corps, facilitating XII British Corps operations. Further, 
I British Corps fixed the majority of Fifteenth Army within its area of 
operations, which in turn lessened the burden on II Canadian Corps 
and XII British Corps. In this respect, 2nd Canadian Division relied 
heavily on I British Corps in its efforts to isolate the South Beveland 
isthmus. Without the advance of 4th Canadian Armoured Division 
and 49th West Riding (WR) Division on their eastern flank, the 
clearance of the Scheldt Estuary would have inevitably been delayed, 
causing a host of operational and strategic issues. Regardless of the 
6
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position I British Corps occupies from a historiographical perspective, 
Crocker’s forces played a decisive role in the operational and strategic 
success of Twenty-First Army Group in October and November 1944.
Crocker arrived north of Antwerp on 23 September and quickly 
found himself torn by operational and strategic priorities. The intent 
was for II Canadian Corps to focus on operations in the Scheldt 
Estuary while I British Corps cleared German forces between 
II Canadian Corps and XII British Corps. The reality was much 
different. Between 27 September to 16 October, Crocker focused 
primarily on securing Second British Army’s left flank, using 49th 
(WR) Division and 1st Polish Armoured Division, as the commander 
of Second British Army, Lieutenant General Miles Dempsey 
attempted to break into the Ruhr. Given the enormity of this task, 
Crocker lacked sufficient forces to support 2nd Canadian Division’s 
attack towards the South Beveland Isthmus. So, while Crocker was 
explicitly directed to support II Canadian Corps, Montgomery’s 
overarching strategic imperative prevented him from accomplishing 
this task.8 In the end, I British Corps’ advance quickly ground to 
a halt as Crocker had insufficient combat power to overcome the 
German defensive positions or maintain a solid frontline.9 
With the culmination of the strategic debate between Eisenhower 
and Montgomery, the directive issued on 16 October to Twenty-First 
Army Group should have eliminated any strategic dissonance that 
8  I British Corps, Operation Instruction No. 16, 9 October 1944, Department of 
National Defence (DND) Fonds, RG24, C17, volume 10 790, Library and Archives 
Canada (LAC); Letter to Lieutenant General Crocker from Field Marshall 
Montgomery, 28 September 1944, John Crocker Personal Papers. John Crocker 
Personal Papers, Letter to George Crocker from Lieutenant General Crocker, 9 
December 1944, page 1. In the letter to Crocker, Montgomery emphasized that 
the “right wing of the (First Canadian) Army must ‘drive’ hard northwards on the 
axis Tilburg-Hertogenbosch.” He  further indicated,  “Breda, and places that way 
(presumably Roosendaal), do not matter.” Developing  operations northwards 
towards the Maas, excluding the advance on Tilburg-Hertogenbosch were obviously 
inconsequential to Montgomery, including any kind of flank support to 2nd Canadian 
Division.  Additionally, in his letter to his brother, Crocker recounted that after 
receiving the letter, “…I was sent for by Montgomery, who told me what he wanted.” 
Montgomery clearly articulated to Crocker that advance of Second British Army 
were the main effort of Twenty-First Army Group.
9  Letter from Lieutenant General Crocker to George Crocker, 9 December 1944, John 
Crocker Personal Papers. In Crocker’s assessment of the situation to his brother, as 
49th (WR) Division established bridgeheads over the Antwerp-Turnhout canal, the 
remainder of I British Corps “… followed up at once, ridiculously thin on the ground 
and still without most of my artillery, tanks, etc…”
7
Wheeler: I British Corps and the Battle of the Scheldt
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2019
8 I British Corps and the Battle of the Scheldt
existed. On the surface, Montgomery’s orders to First Canadian 
Army and Second British Army appeared to reorient Twenty-First 
Army Group’s priorities towards Antwerp. While First Canadian 
Army accelerated operations in the Scheldt with II Canadian Corps, 
Montgomery tasked I and XII British Corps to isolate and destroy 
Fifteenth Army south of the Maas. Montgomery’s directive suggests 
this took the form of a three-phase operation. In phase one, I British 
Corps, on the right flank of First Canadian Army, would advance 
towards Roosendaal/Bergen Op Zoom on 20 October in support 
of 2nd Canadian Division’s efforts to isolate the South Beveland 
isthmus. Composed of two mutually supporting operations, Operation 
Suitcase would be executed by the recently attached 4th Canadian 
Armoured Division, while Clarke Force executed Operation Rebound.10 
Previously, the inter-army boundary of 8 October and the extant task 
of protecting Dempsey’s left flank had prevented any intimate support 
from I British Corps. However, Montgomery’s directive shifted this 
boundary west, allowing the II Canadian Corps and I British Corps 
boundary to shift accordingly.11 By reducing I British Corps’ area 
of responsibility and attaching 4th Canadian Armoured Division, it 
permitted Crocker to focus his combat power on a decisive thrust 
north along 2nd Canadian Division’s eastern flank.
Concurrently, Montgomery directed Second British Army to shut 
down all offensive operations not designed to open the port. Operation 
Pheasant consisted of a reinforced XII Corps attacking west towards 
‘s-Hertogenbosch and Breda on an axis of advance centered on 
Poppel/Breda/Moerdijk. Theoretically, the forty-eight hour delay 
between the two operations suggests that I British Corps would fix 
German forces south of the Maas, while XII British Corps conducted 
a wide-sweeping flank attack to trap and isolate the majority of 
Fifteenth Army in southern Holland.12 Phase three, the destruction of 
Fifteenth Army, would then be executed concurrently by both I and 
XII British Corps. Strategically, the end state envisioned Antwerp 
10  49th (WR) Division Operation Instruction 55 (Operation REBOUND), 17 October 
1944, First Canadian Army, General Staff, October 1944, DND Fonds, RG24, C17, 
volume 13628, LAC; 4th Canadian Armoured Division Operation Instruction 11 (Op 
SUITCASE), 17 October 1944, 4th Canadian Armoured Division, General Staff War 
Diary, September-October 1944, DND Fonds, RG24, C3, volume 13788, LAC 
11  I British Corps, Operation Instruction No. 17, 17 October 1944, DND Fonds, 
RG24, C17, volume 10 790, LAC.
12  Harrison, CMHQ Report #188, DHH, 90.
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open, Fifteenth Army destroyed south of the Maas, the redeployment 
of the majority of Twenty-First Army Group’s combat power east, 
and the effective resupply of Allied forces outlined in Eisenhower’s 
broad front strategy.
Of course this plan was conceptual in nature and does not 
accurately portray the reality or complexity of the situation. In 
order to truly understand the strategic importance of I British 
Corps’ operations to Twenty-First Army Group, it is necessary to 
examine the role Crocker’s forces and XII British Corps played in the 
offensive. A close examination of Montgomery’s 16 October directive 
and the orders issued by both I and XII British Corps suggests an 
uncoordinated and underdeveloped concept of operations.
Crocker issued Operation Instruction Number 17 the formation 
on 17 October 1944. The tasks outlined in the order marked a key 
shift in previous assigned tasks in Operation Instruction Number 
16. While I British Corps retained responsibly for protecting the 
right flank of 2nd Canadian Division, the previously assigned task of 
clearing the Germans south of the Maas is absent.13 Considering the 
direction that Montgomery provided on 16 October, this is a curious 
omission and suggests that Montgomery had not fully developed 
a comprehensive plan to this point. Realistically, with 1st Polish 
Armoured Division and supporting forces fixed in Alphen since 5 
October, and 4th Canadian Armoured Division and Clarke Force 
directed to clear 2nd Canadian Division’s eastern and northern 
flanks, Crocker did not have additional forces to attack north and fix 
LXVII Corps as outlined in Montgomery’s directive. 
It was not until 23 October, when 104th (US) Infantry Division 
came into the I British Corps’ line, that Crocker executed a four-
up division attack against German forces south of the Maas. The 
Division, commanded by Major-General Terry Allen, arrived twenty-
four hours after I British Corps should have fixed LXVII Corps and 
XII British Corps began operations to cut the lines of communication 
over the Maas. This indicates a significant lack of synchronization 
13  I British Corps, Operation Instruction No. 16 and 17, LAC.  Operation Instruction 
No. 16 identifies that I British Corps was tasked “To protect directly the right 
flank 2 Cdn Inf Div whilst it is undertaking offensive ops westwards from the area 
WOENSDRECH [sic] 6020 against SUID BEVELAND” and “To clear enemy at 
present SOUTH of R Maas.” Within Operation Instruction No. 17, I British Corps 
is only tasked “To prevent the enemy interfering with 2 Cdn Inf Div during its ops 
to capture SUID BEVELAND.”
9
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between phase one and two of Montgomery’s concept of operations. 
In execution, as 4th Canadian Armoured Division and Clarke Force 
advanced northwest, a single brigade from the 49th (WR) Division 
occupied the centre of the Corps’ front. Without a coordinated 
advance north in cooperation with XII Corps’ attack east, a gap 
would open between First Canadian Army and Second British Army, 
which in theory could have been exploited by LXVII Corps. 
Evidence indicates that Crocker and his division commanders 
were unaware of Montgomery’s plan for a joint operation between 
I and XII British Corps. It was not until 21 October, six days 
after Montgomery’s directive, that Crocker discussed the concept of 
a coordinated action to trap Fifteenth Army in southern Holland 
with 4th Canadian Armoured Division.14 Similarly, 104th (US) 
Infantry Division did not receive clear direction until 23 October 
when Montgomery personally briefed the division’s senior officers.15 
While Allen’s division did not come onto the line until this date, he 
had met previously with the First Canadian Army Headquarters 
staff on 18 October and with Simonds and the Chief of Staff on 20 
October to discuss 104th (US) Infantry Division’s upcoming role in 
operations.16 Had a comprehensive strategy existed at this point, 
there would have been no requirement for Montgomery to brief Allen’s 
division. This suggests that Crocker and his division commanders 
began operations prior to the development of a coordinated I and 
XII British Corps plan.
Montgomery’s plan also lack clarity with regards to the role 
of XII British Corps during phase two of the operation. In Second 
British Army tasks, he directed Dempsey to attack towards Moerdijk 
with a view to “cutting the communication routes over the Meuse 
[Maas] of all enemy troops south of the river.”17 This implies that 
Montgomery wanted to isolate the majority of Fifteenth Army within 
southern Holland so that XII British Corps could act as the anvil 
14  4th Canadian Armoured Division, General Staff War Diary, September-October 
1944, War Diary, 21 October 1944, DND Fonds, RG24, C3, volume 1788, LAC. First 
Canadian Army, G Plans War Diary, July-October 1944, War Diary, 20 October 
1944, DND Fonds, RG24, C17, volume 13607, LAC.
15  Gerald Astor, Terrible Terry Allen (New York: Ballantine Books, 2003), 255.
16  First Canadian Army, G Plans War Diary, War Diary, 18 and 20 October 1944, 
LAC.
17  Field Marshal Montgomery’s Directive, 16 October 1944, cited in Stacey, The 
Victory Campaign, 655.
10
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to I British Corps’ hammer. However, XII British Corps’ direction 
to its formations lacks any mention of this concept. XII British 
Corps’ Operation Instruction number 17 sets a limit of exploitation 
at Geertruidenberg, identifying the attack to Moerdijk as only a 
possible future task..18 Clearly, this concept of operation would not 
achieve the desired effect outlined by Montgomery in his 16 October 
directive. However, given his predilection to provide direction to 
corps commanders, it is likely that XII British Corps issued these 
orders with Montgomery’s blessing. XII British Corps also issued the 
order on 20 October, which explains why I British Corps had not 
planned for a coordinated operation. In conjunction with the obvious 
issues with the direction issued to I British Corps, it suggests that 
Montgomery did not have a concrete idea of what he wanted to do 
south of the Maas, besides opening Antwerp as quickly as possible to 
reorient his forces east. Without the successful execution of the first 
18  XII British Corps Operation Instruction number 17 (Operation PHEASANT), 
20 October 1944, First Canadian Army, General Staff, October 1944, DND Fonds, 
RG24, C17, volume 13628, LAC.
11
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two phases, Fifteenth Army retained sufficient withdrawal routes and 
crossing sites, rendering Montgomery’s overall objective of destroying 
von Zangen’s forces impossible.
As I British Corps began Operations Suitcase and Rebound, 
it faced LXVII Corps, composed of 85th Division, which had been 
redeployed from LXXXVIII Corps to counter the threat of the 2nd 
Canadian Division at the South Beveland isthmus, the 346th Division, 
the 711th Division, and the 719th Division. First to cross the line 
of departure, 4th Canadian Armoured Division advanced along 2nd 
Canadian Division’s flank towards Esschen and Bergen Op Zoom, 
while Clarke Force provided flank security by attacking Wuestwezel. 
Such was the threat posed to the integrity of LXVII Corps’ defensive 
line by the advance of 4th Canadian Armoured Division and Clarke 
Force’s defeat of 711th Division at Wuestwezel, that it precipitated 
the redeployment of 245th Division to LXVII Corps.19 Initially, 
von Zangen intended to reinforce 85th Division in the Woensdrecht 
19  Elmar Warning, Battles of 67 German Corps between Scheldt and Maas, 15 
September-25 November 1944, DND Fonds, RG24, C17, 20 523, LAC, 33-34.
12
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area against 2nd Canadian Division and to stop the advance of 4th 
Canadian Armoured Division, which followed the overall concept 
of operations for Fifteenth Army. Von Zangen understood that he 
lacked sufficient  forces after the retreat from France to maintain 
a continuous defensive line from the South Beveland isthmus to 
‘s-Hertogenbosch. To compensate for this, he redeployed divisions, 
battle groups, and other combat enablers to points threatened by 
Allied operations and then redeployed them to other hot spots as 
required.20 However, Otto Sponheimer, Commander LXVII Corps, 
believed that Clarke Force’s success at Wuestwezel threatened to split 
the corps in half and potentially collapse Fifteenth Army’s front.21 
Regardless of 85th Division’s desperate need for reinforcements, the 
actions of I British Corps altered the priorities of Fifteenth Army.
The immediate requirement for 245th Division’s transfer east had 
a two-fold effect. First, it limited Fifteenth Army’s ability to hold 
the South Beveland isthmus. As 4th Canadian Armoured Division 
advanced northwards along 2nd Canadian Division’s extended flank, it 
represented an existential threat to von Zangen’s influence over South 
Beveland isthmus, while at the same time Clarke Force threatened 
the integrity of Fifteenth Army’s front. Essentially, Crocker left von 
Zangen two choices: maintain pressure on 2nd Canadian Division and 
risk the destruction of Fifteenth Army, or surrender the isthmus to 
First Canadian Army and temporarily stave off defeat. Both courses 
of action had obvious strategic consequences. Second, the defeat of 
the 245th Division by Clarke Force and its subsequent withdrawal 
northeast to Zundert, maginified the threat to Fifteenth Army. In the 
face of the mounting casualties taken by 85th  and 346th Division, 
the inability to provide reinforcements in the Woensdrecht area, and 
the continued advance of 4th Canadian Armoured Division, von 
Zangen felt he had no choice but to conduct a withdrawal along the 
entire Fifteenth Army front. On 23 October, Sponheimer indicated, 
“Now a withdrawal of the whole front had to be carried out, come 
what might, regardless of OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) 
orders, if the whole corps was not to be sacrificed and the way to 
the Maas left open to the enemy. As a result of the Corps’ strong 
insistence, permission was given for the whole front to be withdrawn 
to the general line of Halsteren (north of Bergen Op Zoom)/South 
20  Steiger, AHQ Report #69, 46.
21  Warning, Battles of 67 German Corps, 33-34.
13
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Roosendaal/South Breda/Alphen North.”22 With this withdrawal, I 
British Corps forced Fifteenth Army to abandon their attempts to 
retain some measure of influence on the South Beveland isthmus.
Crocker’s execution of phase one achieved an important victory 
when it forced Fifteenth Army to abandon control of the isthmus. 
However, the decision by von Zangen to withdraw LXVII Corps to a 
new defensive line between 23 to 24 October also had a considerable 
impact on the evolution of Montgomery’s concept of operations. 
While I British Corps was supposed to fix LXVII Corps, their 
initial success forced the Germans to withdraw almost 20 km north 
in some areas; effectively shortening their main defensive line and 
reducing their area of operation by half. This seems to have left 
Montgomery with two choices: maintain phase two as outlined in 
his 16 October directive with LXVII Corps much closer to the Maas 
than anticipated, or adjust the concept of operations for XII British 
Corps. Montgomery chose the latter and decided to reduce XII 
British Corps’ limit of exploitation to just west of Raamsdonkveer, 
17 km from its original objective of Moerdijk. Although this decision 
may seem like a legitimate tactical decision, evidence suggests that 
Montgomery’s commitment to a determined thrust by XII British 
Corps to isolate Fifteenth Army was marginal at best.
XII British Corps’ operations seem to confirm Montgomery’s 
lack of commitment to the destruction of Fifteenth Army. XII 
British Corps consisted of, running northeast to southwest, 53rd 
(W) Division, 7th British Armoured Division, 51st (H) Division, and 
15th (S) Division. Supporting this attack were 33rd Tank Brigade, 
6th Guards Tank Brigade, and 4th Armoured Brigade. Considering 
they faced three understrength divisions, XII British Corps held a 
considerable advantage against LXXXVIII Corps. The initial stages 
of Operation Pheasant indicate a staggered assault. 53rd (W) Division 
and 7th British Armoured Division began their advance towards 
‘s-Hertogenbosch in the early morning of 22 October. Two days later, 
51st (H) Division attacked northwest with a general axis of advance 
west of ‘s-Hertogenbosch while 15th (S) Division struck out towards 
Tilburg. By this time, I British Corps had already precipitated LXVII 
Corps withdrawal to their new defensive line. 
As XII British Corps continued its advance, 51st (H) Division 
attacked northwest towards ‘s−Hertogenbosch on 25 October, while 
22  Ibid. 34.
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7th Armoured Division consolidated behind their lines and then 
advanced west towards Loon Op Zoom, capturing Udenhout on 27 
October. On the same day, 15th (S) Division and 6th Guards Tank 
Brigade cleared Tilburg and were subsequently withdrawn from the 
line the following day to counter a German offensive in the Venlo 
area. By this time, German resistance stiffened along the entire XII 
British Corps front.
Allied intelligence and reconnaissance reports indicated that 
LXXXVIII Corps intended to retreat to bridgeheads over the Maas. 
In conjunction with this withdrawal, they established a defensive line 
from Dongen to the Afwaterings Canal on 24 October, which tied into 
LXVII Corps position. Beyond this line, LXXXVIII Corps controlled 
crossing sites at Raamsdonkveer, Huesden, and Hedel where German 
forces either crossed by bridge or makeshift ferries. In an effort to 
reduce these bridgeheads, 53rd (W) Division advanced north from 
‘s-Hertogenbosch while 51st (H) and 7th British Armoured Division, 
through combined efforts, attacked the bridgeheads at Raamsdonkveer 
and Huesden. While successful, LXXXVIII Corps managed to hold 
these bridgeheads until 5 November, effectively preventing any further 
advance westwards by XII British Corps.
To this effect, Terry Copp’s argument that Montgomery 
demonstrated marginal commitment to XII British Corps’ advance 
west in support of First Canadian Army’s operations merits 
investigation.23 An examination of the message logs between I British 
Corps and XII British Corps develops a common theme—a painfully 
slow advance west by XII British Corps towards Moerdijk. Situation 
reports indicate that until 28 October, LXXXVIII Corps put up 
minimal resistance, with a few exceptions in Middelrode against 
7th British Armoured Division and house-to-house fighting in 
‘s-Hertogenbosch against 53rd (W) Division. The Germans primarily 
relied on delaying operations, including obstacles, mines, and bridge 
demolition to slow the British advance. Operations such as this 
represented the only viable course of action for LXXXVIII Corps at 
the time. Had they tried to effect a standard defensive line in their 
weakened state, they likely would have been overrun.
When XII British Corps attacked on 22 October, LXXXVIII 
Corps only had 59th Division and a much reduced 712th Division to 
hold the front. Its remaining division, the 245th had redeployed east 
23  Copp, Cinderella Army, 157.
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to counter the advance of I British Corps. To reinforce the German 
corps, 256th Volksgrenadier Division began arriving piecemeal from 
Germany beginning the night of 19 to 20 October and only established 
a defensive line from Dongden/Loon Op Zand/Vught on 25 October. 
This explains why XII British Corps reported a stiffening of German 
resistance between 28 to 30 October, as lead elements of 51st (H) 
Division and 7th British Armoured Division came into contact with 
256th Volksgrenadier Division at this time.24 That being said, by 
24 October, 712th Division had effectively been destroyed by the 
53rd (W) Division in ‘s-Hertogenbosch, forcing 59th Division to 
absorb their responsibilities on the front.25 A decisive strike through 
59th Division may have allowed XII British Corps to overrun 256th 
Volksgrenadier Division as it attempted to establish its defensive line.
Why did XII British Corps have such a difficult time against 
a vastly inferior force? The important element to be gleaned from 
the situation reports and message logs is that XII British Corps 
seemed content to methodically push the Germans out of southern 
Holland rather than trap Fifteenth Army south of the Maas. 
Montgomery opted for his standard set-piece attack to reduce and 
attrite LXXXVIII Corps, contrary to what he outlined as his phase 
two objective—cutting the lines of communication over the Maas at 
Moerdijk. Despite pushing elements of von Zangen’s forces north of 
the Maas, it failed to achieve his purported strategic end state—the 
destruction of Fifteenth Army. 
Post-war reporting from LXXXVIII Corps reflects this fact. 
According to General H.W. Reinhard, commander of LXXXVIII 
Corps, XII British Corps could have rolled up the entire Corps front 
at St. Michels-Gestel and Esch had they maintained continuous 
pressure on 59th Division during the initial stages of Operation 
Pheasant.26 Considering XII British Corps attacked this section of 
LXXXVIII Corps’ defensive line with two infantry divisions, an 
armoured division, and two independent tank brigades, the destruction 
of this overstretched and weakened division should have been easily 
achievable. Although Reinhard does concede that XII British Corps 
24  1 British Corps, War Diary and Message Logs, October-November 1944, Message 
Logs, 280415October1944 and 300340October1944, DHH, Kardex, 79.681, Reel 4.
25  Steiger, AHQ Report #69, 54.
26  H.W. Reinhard, 88 German Corps Commitment from Albert Canal to the Lower 
Maas - 5 September-21 December 1944, DND Fonds, RG24, C17, 20 523, LAC, 18.
16
Canadian Military History, Vol. 28 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 20
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol28/iss2/20
  17W H E E L E R 
pressed the Germans as they moved north, he also argues that the 
pressure was not so determined to prevent an orderly withdrawal 
by LXXXVIII Corps’ formations.27 As the corps and division 
headquarters, along with the vast majority of the Corps’ artillery 
and enablers, withdrew across the Maas intact and supported the 
infantry division’s withdrawal through the bridgeheads, Reinhard’s 
assessment of XII British Corps’ slow advance has merit.28 The 
slow advance of the British allowed 256th Volksgrenadier Division 
to establish a long defensive line, which prevented any significant 
penetration north. This enabled LXXXVIII Corps to maintain 
bridgeheads at Raamsdonkveer until 1 November, Huesden until 5 
November, and Hedel held until 7 or 8 November. The fact that XII 
British Corps did not capture a bridge intact is also indicative of 
Reinhard’s claim of a controlled withdrawal of German forces. Even 
though LXXXVIII Corps did manage to withdraw north across the 
Maas, it did not escape unscathed. XII British Corps inflicted heavy 
casualties and left LXXXVIII Corps considerably weakened, if not 
combat ineffective.29 Nevertheless, reporting from both German and 
British forces seems to indicate that XII British Corps failed to take 
advantage of a weakened enemy.30
Another indication of Montgomery’s strategic fixation to the east 
was the transfer of units from XII British Corps to VIII British 
Corps prior to clearing all German forces from south of the Maas. 
15th (S) Division and 6th Guards Tank Brigade completed operations 
on the south-western flank of XII British Corps in Tilburg on 27 
October. The previous day, in an effort to draw the Allies away from 
the Maas and lessen the burden on Fifteenth Army, von Rundstedt 
directed the execution of a spoiling attack in the Venlo area against 
Twenty-First Army Group’s eastern flank. Under specific direction 
from Montgomery to counter the threat to VIII British Corps, the 
two formations were redirected east to stem the advance of German 
forces on 28 October. Were they actually required though? Charles 
MacDonald indicates that by 28 October, 7th (US) Armored Division, 
under VIII British Corps, had stopped the German offensive in 
cooperation with a significant Allied air offensive. While likely 
27  Reinhard, 88 German Corps, 22-23.
28  Ibid., 22-24. 
29  Ibid. 
30  Ibid., 18.
17
Wheeler: I British Corps and the Battle of the Scheldt
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2019
18 I British Corps and the Battle of the Scheldt
unknown to Montgomery or Dempsey, the actions of the Americans 
convinced von Rundstedt that there was little to gain from continued 
offensive operations and he cancelled subsequent efforts.31 So, by the 
time that 15th (S) Division and the 6th Guards Tank Bridge began 
their movement to Venlo, VIII British Corps’ front had stabilized 
and the crisis averted. In the end, British reinforcements assisted 
with the restoration of the previous gains of VIII Corps.
MacDonald also makes a seemingly innocuous statement that the 
transfer of the two formations made little difference to XII British 
Corps’ operations as they had already completed their assigned tasks 
in the offensive to open Antwerp.32 Yet Montgomery’s 16 October 
directive clearly stated, “The whole of the available offensive power 
of Second Army will now be brought to bear (on Antwerp)….”33 From 
this, it can be reasoned that 15th (S) Division and the 6th Guards 
Tank Bridge had a limited objective of Tilburg, potentially without 
subsequent assigned tasks. Similarly, A.G. Steiger argues that by 
29 October, “…the current crisis of Fifteenth Army had passed its 
climax, the battle was lost and any withdrawals of Allied forces from 
that front at this late stage would be of scant significance.”34 Both 
assessments are derived from a misunderstanding of the situation 
within southern Holland and the impact these two units could have 
had on operations. Despite the fact that they captured Tilburg, XII 
British Corps struggled to reduce German bridgeheads over the Maas 
into the first week of November. As previously mentioned, this was 
also the period in which XII British Corps first came into contact 
with 256th Volksgrenadier Division’s main defensive line. Coupled 
with the fact the responsibility for the capture of Moerdijk was 
transferred to Crocker’s forces, these two formations could have been 
gainfully employed within either I British Corps’ or XII Corps’ area 
of operations.
For example, while 7th British Armoured Division and 51st (H) 
Division reduced the bridgeheads north in the Raamsdonkveer and 
Huesden areas, 15th (S) Division and 6th Guards Tank Brigade 
could have struck northwest towards Moerdijk, supporting 1st Polish 
31  Charles B. MacDonald, United States Army in World War II: European Theater 
of Operations, The Siegfried Line Campaign (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1963), 245-246.
32  MacDonald, Siegfried Line, 246.
33  Montgomery’s 16 October directive cited in Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 655.
34  Steiger, AHQ Report #69, 61.
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Armoured Division. On 28 October, 719th Division withdrew from 
Breda to assume command of the Moerdijk bridgehead. Had 15th (S) 
Division and 6th Guards Tank Brigade attacked towards Moerdijk 
with 1st Polish Armoured Division, it is likely they would have 
caught 719th Division in the midst of a withdrawal. Their subsequent 
destruction and the capture of Moerdijk by these three formations 
likely would have shortened operations south of the Maas and led to 
additional Fifteenth Army casualties. Another plausible option saw 
them supporting the reduction of the bridgehead at Raamsdonkveer 
and the destruction of German forces at Geertruidenberg, thus freeing 
1st Polish Armoured Division to advance directly on Moerdijk.35 Both 
of these actions would have outflanked 256th Volksgrenadier Division’s 
defensive line. Given these examples, legitimate tasks remained for 
either of these formations. The burden on I British Corps certainly 
would have been reduced and may have facilitated the isolation and 
destruction of Fifteenth Army. Montgomery’s direct intervention to 
transfer these two formations east demonstrates that while he professed 
Antwerp as his top priority, his strategic focus remained fixed on the 
Ruhr regardless of what his strategic direction indicated.
Crocker and his division commanders would likely have been 
surprised at XII British Corps’ methodical advance west and the 
reallocation of its formations to support operations not designed 
to open Antwerp. Copp identifies that during Montgomery’s visit 
to 4th Canadian Armoured Division Headquarters on 25 October, 
the concept of trapping Fifteenth Army was abandoned.36 Similarly, 
L.F. Ellis indicates that on 27 October Crocker issued orders for I 
British Corps’ final drive to the Maas, which included the capture of 
Moerdijk.37 XII British Corps’ orders on 27 October also reflect this 
change in the concept of operations.38 The re-tasking of the capture 
of Moerdijk to I British Corps indicates that clearing Fifteenth Army 
south of the Maas, not destroying it, was now the primary objective 
of phase three of the operation. Had XII British Corps actually cut off 
Fifteenth Army’s withdrawal routes, LXVII Corps likely would have 
35  I British Corps, War Diary and Message Logs, War Diary, 4 November 1944. 
36  Copp, Cinderella Army, 157.
37  L.F. Ellis, The Defeat of Germany, Vol. II, Victory in the West (London: Her 
Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1968), 193.
38  XII British Corps Operation Instruction number 18 (Operation PHEASANT), 
27 October 1944, First Canadian Army, General Staff, October 1944, DND Fonds, 
RG24, C17, volume 13628, LAC.
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been limited to two options: be destroyed or surrender. Instead, phase 
three transitioned from a combined I and XII British Corps isolate 
and destroy operation to I British Corps independently executing a 
concerted clearance operation to push back an enemy determined to 
delay and fix them for as long as possible.
In examining von Zangen’s strategic plan, it is obvious that 
Fifteenth Army had two principal strategic objectives: deny the 
Allies the use of Antwerp and fix Allied forces in southern Holland.39 
Both of these objectives sought to prevent the Allies from striking 
into Germany. Considering these two objectives, the area between 
Geertruidenberg and ‘s-Hertogenbosch (XII British Corps’ area of 
operations), was not required for von Zangen to successfully execute 
his mission. While he was able to fix XII British Corps for a period of 
time, this area did little to facilitate the retention of the South Beveland 
isthmus or influence Antwerp. Simply put, Fifteenth Army could 
lose this area with minimal impact on the accomplishment of their 
main effort. In fact, Model had recommended, with von Rundstedt’s 
support, that this area be evacuated as early as 24 September in order 
to gain the necessary reserves to either secure the Bergen Op Zoom/
Roosendaal/Moerdijk bridgehead or prevent a breakthrough between 
Arnhem and Aachen.40 Unsurprisingly, this concept is reflected in von 
Zangen’s actions. For Fifteenth Army, its vital ground encompassed 
Woensdrecht/Bergen Op Zoom/Roosendaal/Breda/Moerdijk, which 
corresponded with I British Corps’ area of operations and the bulk 
of von Zangen’s forces. Had Fifteenth Army retained this area, it 
would have denied the Allies the use of Antwerp and tied down, 
at a minimum, First Canadian Army and potentially elements of 
Second British Army. Thus, only through I British Corps’ advance 
northwards could von Zangen’s strategy have been undermined and 
Fifteenth Army decisively defeated. 
The initial thrust of 4th Canadian Armoured Division and Clarke 
Force on 20 October, and the subsequent response by von Zangen, 
demonstrates the importance of the threat posed by Crocker’s forces. 
The continued advance of I British Corps magnified this threat 
exponentially. By 27 October, I British Corps was threatening 
the newly established Halstren/South Roosendaal/South Breda/
39  CMHQ, Special Interrogation Report – General Gustav von Zangen, Kardex, 
981.065, DHH, 4.
40  Steiger, AHQ Report #69, 33.
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Alphen line. 4th Canadian Armoured Division had finally cleared 
the northern outskirts of Bergen Op Zoom on 28 October, 49th 
(WR) Division found itself south of Roosendaal, 104th (US) 
Division had captured Zundert in its first combat operation, and 1st 
Polish Division prepared to break the stalemate at Alphen. From 
this position, Crocker ordered 4th Canadian Armoured Division 
to attack towards Steenbergen while 49th (WR) Division cleared 
Roosendaal on its right flank. Allen’s division attacked towards 
Standdarrbuiten to seize a crossing point over the Mark River at 
the same time that 1st Polish Armoured Division captured Breda 
and pushed on to Moerdijk.
Opposition was fierce as I British Corps attempted to push the 
bulk of Fifteenth Army north of the Maas. Between 28 October and 2 
November, 4th Canadian Armoured Division fought a hard campaign 
against 85th Division and 6th Para Regiment north of Bergen Op 
Zoom and onto Steenbergen. On 3 November, the division entered 
the town and the following day forced the Germans to withdraw to 
Dinteloord. Following up their success, the division linked up with 
elements of the 49th (WR) Division on the outskirts of Dinteloord 
and subsequently forced the remaining Germans north of the Maas.41 
To the east, 49th (WR) Division successfully captured Roosendaal 
on 30 October and continued its advance to the Mark River. Both 
49th (WR) Division and 104th (US) Infantry Division successfully 
crossed the river on 2 November under heavy fire causing the collapse 
of the Mark River defensive line. The Polar Bears then assaulted 
towards Willemsted on the Maas, capturing the town on 5 November.
Prior to crossing the river, 104th (US) Division also encountered 
a determined German enemy. Capturing Oudenbosch on 30 October, 
Allen’s division reached the canal first on 31 October and attempted 
a rapid crossing in the hopes of catching the Germans off guard. 
Unfortunately, after a two-day battle and heavy casualties, the 
division withdrew and reattempted the crossing with 49th (WR) 
Division. Having successfully established a bridgehead across the 
Mark River on 2 November, Allen’s Timberwolves continued towards 
Moerdijk, and assaulted the German bridgehead in cooperation with 
1st Polish Armoured Division. 
On the right flank of I British Corps, 1st Polish Armoured Division 
successfully broke the stalemate at Alphen and captured Breda on 
41  Harrison, CMHQ Report No. 188, 96.
21
Wheeler: I British Corps and the Battle of the Scheldt
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2019
22 I British Corps and the Battle of the Scheldt
28 October in cooperation with 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade 
and Imp Force. The Poles then split into two brigade groups: one 
attacking along the I/XII British Corps boundary to Geertruidenberg 
and the other towards Moerdijk in a converging attack with 104th 
(US) Infantry Division on 8 November. Although the Poles and 
Americans successfully cleared the remnants of Fifteenth Army from 
south of the Maas, they found the bridge across it had been destroyed 
two-days prior.
I British Corps’ attack to the Maas proved to be decisive in the 
defeat of Fifteenth Army. O.B. West’s situation report for 29 October 
indicated that I British Corps’ operations in Bergen Op Zoom, 
Roosendaal, north of Zundert and southeast of Breda threatened to 
collapse the front. Within the same situation report, the Germans 
indicated that XII British Corps’ attacks had been halted north 
of Loon Op Zand and did not threaten the integrity of Fifteenth 
Army’s front.42 Later in the day, Model informed von Rundstedt that 
Fifteenth Army either had to begin its withdrawal north of the Maas 
or fight on to its ultimate destruction.43 While at no time did XII 
British Corps force Fifteenth Army to radically alter its front lines, 
by 29 October, I British Corps’ operations shifted von Zangen’s main 
effort from fixing the Allies in southern Holland to saving what he 
could of Fifteenth Army.
Without a sufficient threat within I British Corps’ area of 
operations, all indications were that von Zangen would redeploy forces 
to counter the threat posed by XII British Corps. In this respect, 
Crocker’s actions completely undermined Fifteenth Army’s defensive 
strategy. By forcing the redeployment of elements of LXXXVIII Corps 
into I British Corps’ area of operations, Crocker not only weakened 
LXXXVIII Corps’ position but also fixed these units within LXVII 
Corps’ area of operations. Thus, the previous use of “fire department 
brigades” to shore up weak points in Fifteenth Army’s defensive line 
was rendered untenable. Similarly, the existential threat posed by 
I British Corps forced von Zangen to immediately redeploy 245th 
Division west. As 256th Volksgrenadier Division was still in the 
process of transporting elements of its division from Germany, the 
relief in place was conducted with only part of its combat power 
42  O.B. West Situation Report, 29 October 1944, cited in Steiger, AHQ Report #69, 
59.
43  Ibid., 61.
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in position. Without its full combat power by the time the relief in 
place was ordered, 256th Volksgrenadier Division lacked the strength 
to maintain the previous defensive line held by 245th Division. As 
1st Polish Armoured Division’s operations in the vicinity of Breda 
threatened to turn their right flank, it forced their withdrawal north, 
eventually on an extended defensive line from Dongen to Vught on 
25 October.44 This meant, for the first part of XII British Corps’ 
advance west, it faced only the 59th Division stretched along the 
entire front and the 712th Division occupying ‘s-Hertogenbosch. In 
large part, this explains why German resistance was minimal until 
28 October and why 15th (S) Division faced little opposition when 
capturing Tilburg.45 Considering the slow rate of advance by XII 
British Corps against two understrength divisions, the addition of a 
third likely would have further impeded XII British Corps’ operations 
considerably. XII British Corps’ operations were, in reality, supporting 
in nature to the decisive operations of I British Corps. 
As Crocker’s forces attacked north on 20 October, they gradually 
reduced Fifteenth Army’s ability to influence the South Beveland 
isthmus and by 24 October had, in conjunction with 2nd Canadian 
Division, sealed off the isthmus completely. Although this permitted 
II Canadian Corps to execute Operations Vitality and Infatuate, 
the clearance of South Beveland and Walcheren Island respectively, 
Fifteenth Army still retained the ability to fix Allied forces in the 
west. As I British Corps developed subsequent operations north, XII 
British Corps’ methodical advance west and the redeployment of 15th 
(S) Division and 6th Guards Tank Brigade east left Crocker to face 
the bulk of von Zangen’s forces. During the final days of operations 
in southern Holland, I British Corps reduced the Bergen Op Zoom/
Roosendaal/Breda/Moerdijk bridgehead and forced Fifteenth Army 
to withdraw.46 Having undermined von Zangen’s strategic concept 
and pushed his forces north of the Maas, it is evident that I British 
Corps was instrumental in achieving Montgomery’s altered phase 
three, allowing him to reorient Twenty-First Army Group east.
An analysis of I British Corps’ relationship with II Canadian 
Corps is equally important to understand the operational and 
44  Reinhard, 88 German Corps, 19.
45  Ibid., 22. 
46  I British Corps, Operation Order No. 5, 1 November 1944, DND Fonds, RG24, 
C17, volume 10 790, LAC.
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strategic significance of its operations. Regardless of the evident 
shortcomings in Montgomery’s overall plan to open the port of 
Antwerp, his 16 October directive enabled I British Corps to operate 
jointly with 2nd Canadian Division in its efforts to secure the South 
Beveland isthmus. I British Corps’ operations, in relation to II 
Canadian Corps, have normally been relegated to the margins of 
history. However, a careful examination of the facts paints a much 
different picture. Instead of executing a simple flank security task, 
I British Corps, specifically 4th Canadian Armoured Division and 
49th (WR) Division, played a decisive role in securing the isthmus in 
partnership with 2nd Canadian Division. More importantly, without I 
British Corps’ support, 2nd Canadian Division would likely not have 
been able to achieve its objectives within the greater context of First 
Canadian Army’s clearance of the Scheldt Estuary. Through this 
action, I British Corps set the conditions for II Canadian Corps and 
First Canadian Army to achieve operational success and strategic 
success within an Allied context.
The importance of the South Beveland isthmus was recognized 
by both the Allies and the Germans. Walcheren Island and South 
Beveland were connected to the mainland through a narrow isthmus 
approximately 25 km north of Antwerp. Whomever controlled the 
isthmus, controlled access to the Scheldt. From the German Army’s 
perspective, their initial defensive planning assumed that Antwerp 
would be retained, thus covering the land approaches into the Scheldt. 
By maintaining control over these two areas, any Allied assault 
on the Scheldt would have to be amphibious. Compared to a land 
based assault, amphibious operations are resource intensive, both in 
equipment and training. Thus, any delay in the capture of the Scheldt 
facilitated Fifteenth Army’s task to fix Allied forces in southern 
Holland. Second British Army’s capture of Antwerp had completely 
undermined this strategy. As the Allies threatened to push north of 
the city in early September, the possibility existed that they could 
have seized the isthmus and launched a land-based assault into South 
Beveland. Of course, this came to naught and Second British Army 
continued its advance towards Germany, allowing Fifteenth Army 
to extricate itself through the Scheldt. Consequently, throughout 
September and October 1944, LXVII Corps’ and Fifteenth Army’s 
main effort aimed to counter this Allied threat. 
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The Allies recognized the requirement for a land based approach 
into the Scheldt early in the planning phase of the operation.47 
Montgomery first mentioned the use of the isthmus as a route into 
South Beveland in a letter to the Commander of First Canadian 
Army, Harry Crerar, on 13 September 1944, which outlined his future 
plans for the Channel Ports and Antwerp.48 Subsequent Canadian 
planning and direction throughout September indicated that both 
Crerar and Simonds considered its capture, along with the capture 
of Bergen Op Zoom and Roosendaal, as a pre-condition to attacking 
South Beveland and Walcheren Island.49 Both Canadian generals 
outright rejected a purely amphibious operation to clear the Scheldt 
Estuary. With few suitable landing sites on South Beveland and 
Walcheren Island, a large-scale amphibious operation would allow 
the German fortress commander, Lieutenant General W. Daser, to 
concentrate his limited forces at these key sites. Consequently, an 
amphibious assault would result in the Allies attacking into well-
prepared kill zones with Daser capable of maintaining a tactical 
reserve to reinforce threatened landing sites.
Any attempt to launch a waterborne assault across the West 
Scheldt, in Crerar’s and Simonds’ estimation, required a concurrent 
land-based attack in order to disperse Daser’s forces. Even if a 
sufficient number of landing sites did exist, the necessary number 
of landing craft and the time required to conduct training did not.50 
Given the necessity of the isthmus to First Canadian Army operations, 
its successful capture had considerable strategic significance. First 
Canadian Army would have to secure the isthmus to attack west, 
in conjunction with a more limited amphibious operation in order to 
clear the Scheldt and open the port of Antwerp. 
To secure the isthmus, Simonds tasked 2nd Canadian Division, 
commanded by Major-General R.H. Keefler, to clear the right flank 
of II Canadian Corps. Despite the strategic importance of this task, 
2nd Canadian Division received negligible support. Relieved by 4th 
47  Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 358, 369. 
48  Ibid.
49  First Canadian Army, G Plans War Diary, July-October 1944, Operation Infatuate 
- An Appreciation, 19 September 1944, DND Fonds, RG24, C17, volume 13607, LAC; 
First Canadian Army, G Plans War Diary, July-October 1944, Op ‘Infatuate’ - Notes 
on Conference, 21 September 1944, DND Fonds, RG24, C17, volume 13607, LAC.
50  First Canadian Army, G Plans War Diary, Op ‘Infatuate’ - Notes on Conference, 
21 September 1944.
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Special Service Brigade at Dunkirk, 2nd Canadian Division moved 
north to relieve 53rd (W) Division of XII British Corps in the 
Antwerp area on 16 September. This allowed First Canadian Army’s 
area of operations to shift east relieving XII British Corps along the 
Antwerp-Turnhout canal so they could support Operation Market 
Garden. Between 18 to 24 September, Keefler’s division successfully 
pushed the Germans out of the Antwerp suburb of Merxem northeast 
of the city. Leaving 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade to hold their 
gains in Antwerp, the remainder of the division pushed east along 
the southern edge of the Antwerp-Turnhout Canal. After several 
unsuccessful attempts to establish a bridgehead, they crossed at 49th 
(WR) Division’s bridgehead south of Ryckervosel.51 Emerging from 
the bridgehead, they advanced west, capturing St. Leonard on 28 
September and Brecht on 1 October.  Having cleared the north bank 
of the Antwerp-Turnhout canal, 2nd Canadian Division reoriented 
north on two axes of advance along the Putte/Woensdrecht road and 
the Maria ter Heide/Esschen road. Given the inability of II Canadian 
Corps or I British Corps to provide direct support, Keefler and his 
division must have felt increasingly isolated.
2nd Canadian Division suffered from Montgomery’s continued 
desire to push east into Germany. With I British Corp’s operational 
focus consumed by its flank security task, the obstacles to 2nd 
Canadian Division’s operations mounted. Between 5 to 16 October, 2nd 
Canadian Division fought a vicious campaign against the 70th, 85th, 
and 346th Divisions in an attempt to seal off the isthmus and establish 
a secure base from which to launch operations into South Beveland. 
From 2nd Canadian Division’s perspective, their most challenging 
opponent came in the form of 6th Parachute Regiment. Employed 
as the vanguard of Lieutenant General Kurt Chill’s 85th Division, 
Colonel Frederich von der Heydte, commanded the 6th Parachute 
Regiment. Recently arrived from Germany, the regiment consisted of 
“twenty-five hundred fanatical and eager young parachutists.52 The 
first two battalions of von der Heydte’s regiment arrived in Bergen 
Op Zoom on 8 October and engaged in zealous combat against 2nd 
Canadian Division until they were forced to withdraw by I British 
Corps’ in late October. Battles such as Hoogerheide and Woensdrecht 
51  Harrison, CMHQ Report #188, 48. 
52  CMHQ, Special Interrogation Report –Lieutenant General Erich Diestel, Kardex, 
981.065, DHH, 7.
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are recounted as bloody slaughters by both the Canadians and the 
Germans.53 Regardless of the deployment of the “elite” 6th Parachute 
Regiment, on 16 October O.B. West and Fifteenth Army reported 
that the isthmus had been lost and that its recapture was no longer 
possible.54 While 2nd Canadian Division managed to sever the link 
between 70th Division in South Beveland and LXVII Corps on 
the mainland, they lacked the necessary support to attack into the 
Scheldt. The real dilemma facing Keefler was if his division could 
hold its position, and resist German counter-attacks. 
The reality of the situation did not favour the Canadians. 2nd 
Canadian Division suffered heavy casualties during its advance north 
and the ensuing operations to capture the isthmus. While this left 
many of the battalions undermanned, the division’s key leadership 
suffered a disproportional number of casualties. Battalion casualties 
varied from 5 to 30 per cent from 1 to 16 October, however, when 
non-infantry personnel are subtracted from the battalions’ effective 
strength, these percentages rise significantly. Take for example, the 
Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (RHLI). Between 16 and 17 October, 
their companies reported an average strength of forty-five men.55 
After Woensdrecht, the Black Watch fared little better, reporting a 
combined effective strength of 379 soldiers in its four rifle companies. 
Thus, the regiment’s companies had the effective strength of reinforced 
platoons. Officer casualties only exacerbated the situation. Between 
1 to 16 October, the RHLI lost twenty of its thirty-five officers while 
the South Saskatchewan Regiment lost a staggering thirty of its 
thirty-one officers.56
Given the heavy casualties, defensive lines were not continuous 
along the battalion/brigade/division front and reconnaissance patrols 
could not be conducted due to manpower shortages.57 This denied 
2nd Canadian Division units important intelligence gathering 
operations and afforded the Germans a certain freedom of manoeuvre 
to infiltrate porous defensive positions. While the LXVII Corps’ 
53  Denis Whitaker, Tug of War: The Allied Victory That Opened Antwerp (Toronto: 
Stoddart, 2000), 175.
54  Steiger, AHQ Report #69, 50.
55  Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 385.
56  First Canadian Army, Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General War Diary, 
September-October 1944, Casualty and Strength Report for 16 October 1944, 
Department of National Defence Fonds, RG24, C17, volume 13 659, LAC.
57  Whitaker, Tug of War, 219.
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situation was as bad or worse, it did not negate the threat they 
presented to 2nd Canadian Division. For example, Huijbergen and 
south of Bergen Op Zoom were still controlled by 85th Division as 
late as 21 October.58 Division intelligence reports reflected this threat, 
assessing that LXVII Corps was still capable of influencing their 
operations in the Woensdrecht and surrounding area.59 Local attacks 
and artillery fire by German forces forces continued, forcing Keefler 
to maintain all three of his brigades in a defensive posture unless 
they were conducting local offensive operations. Any reorientation 
west would have resulted in the destruction of the Canadian division. 
In reality both sides had culminated. While the isthmus had 
been lost to the Allies on 16 October, the threat the Germans faced 
was largely a paper tiger.60 2nd Canadian Division did in fact hold 
the isthmus, but they had to maintain their tactical and operational 
focus on the immediate German threat, thus preventing them from 
consolidating and attacking into South Beveland. The secondary 
effect of their operational focus was that First Canadian Army could 
not execute its plans for the clearance of the Scheldt. Even with the 
isthmus in Canadian possession, von Zangen could still accomplish 
his objective of denying Antwerp to the Allies as long as LXVII 
Corps posed a threat to 2nd Canadian Division. 
Without reinforcements or operations to secure their eastern and 
northern flanks, 2nd Canadian Division was essentially fixed. Fifth 
Canadian Infantry Brigade’s war diarist summed up the frustrations 
of the division quite succinctly: “Cannot understand why they do 
not put more troops in the area and finish the job once and for all 
instead of playing about shifting first one battalion then another. 
This is beginning to look like a winter campaign unless something 
breaks soon.”61 Comments like this would have been exactly what 
von Zangen wanted to hear as LXVII Corps and Fifteenth Army 
continued to pursue operations against the Canadians on the 
isthmus. Without the removal of this threat, 2nd Canadian Division 
58  Warning, Battles of 67 German Corps, 27, 32.
59  2nd Canadian Infantry Division, General Staff War Diary, August-November 
1944, 2nd Canadian Infantry Division Intelligence Report, 22 October 1944, DND 
Fonds, RG24, C17, volume 13 751, LAC.
60  War Diary, O.B. West, entry dated 16 October 1944 cited in Steiger, AHQ Report 
#69, 50.
61  5th Canadian Infantry Brigade War Diary, 16 October, cited in Copp, Cinderella 
Army, 145.
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was unable to achieve Simonds precondition for the assault on the 
Scheldt. In Stacey’s words, “Until we could establish a much firmer 
grip on the area about the eastern end of the isthmus it was useless 
to think of advancing into South Beveland.”62 
Nominally, this support was supposed to come from I British 
Corps. Crocker’s orders on 8 October directed the Corps to advance 
north on 2nd Canadian Division’s right flank to support the capture 
of the isthmus and clear all enemy forces south of the Maas. As it 
has been previously established, Crocker lacked the necessary combat 
power to provide this support. With their flank security task still in 
effect, supporting 2nd Canadian Division into South Beveland was 
simply impossible. Even if they had sufficient forces, the boundary 
between I British Corps and XII British Corps left Bergen Op Zoom 
and Steenbergen within 2nd Canadian Division’s area of operations. 
A quick map estimate clearly indicates that leaving this area in 2nd 
Canadian Division’s area of operations prevented I British Corps from 
influencing the battle between Keefler’s division and the German 
forces. In addition, the idea that I British Corps was capable of 
clearing most of Fifteenth Army south of the Maas was fantastical. 
Crocker’s directive was an admission that I British Corps had 
effectively lost its ability to conduct determined offensive operations. 
The extended front line and lack of manoeuvre units meant that 
I British Corps had to “maintain a defensive policy with active 
patrolling and local offensive action when and if considered desirable 
by Div Comds.”63 Crocker’s paragraph on future tasks painted an 
even grimmer picture for the prospects of his corps. Without the 
addition of 4th Canadian Armoured Division, anticipated sometime 
between 15 and 21 October, he identified that I British Corps 
lacked the necessary forces to secure 2nd Canadian Division’s right 
flank. Crocker seemed to be at a loss as to what he was expected 
to achieve with an infantry and armoured division. Although he 
provided timelines for attacks on Tilburg and ‘s−Hertogenbosch, 
these operations were directly related to Second British Army’s flank 
security. His primary task of clearing German forces south of the 
Maas was left to be determined. What is more important in this 
context is that 2nd Canadian Division was incapable of achieving its 
operational objectives without I British Corps’ support.
62  Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 386.
63  Ibid.
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After the resolution of the strategic debate with Eisenhower, 
Montgomery’s 16 October directive set the conditions for I British 
Corps to isolate the South Beveland isthmus in conjunction with 
2nd Canadian Division. Crocker’s eastern boundary, established 
on 8 October, shifted west to Poppel/Tilburg and the task of flank 
security for Second British Army was removed. More importantly, 
First Canadian Army’s inter-corps boundary shifted west along a 
the line Capellen/Putte/Hoogerheide and then west to the sea. With 
the reduction in Crocker’s area of operations and the shift of the 
First Canadian Army inter-corps boundary, I British Corps was now 
capable of directly supporting 2nd Canadian Division, given they 
received the necessary reinforcements.
The addition of 4th Canadian Armoured Division to I British 
Corps partially solved Crocker’s combat strength issue. As previously 
mentioned, I British Corps plan consisted of a two division attack 
along the right flank of 2nd Canadian Division. Major-General H.W. 
Foster, commander of 4th Canadian Armoured Division, planned to 
attack two-up with reorganized brigade groups towards Esschen in 
Operation Suitcase. In his path lay Lieutenant-General Diestel’s 346th 
Division. At the same time, Clarke Force’s Operation Rebound sought 
to fix the 711th Division en route to Wuestwezel and provide flank 
security to Foster’s division. If successful, 4th Canadian Armoured 
Division would attack northwest to Bergen Op Zoom while Clarke 
Force maintained flank security. The intent was to either encircle 
the German forces threatening 2nd Canadian Division, or force 
them to withdraw north. Either scenario saw 2nd Canadian Division 
consolidating in the Woensdrecht area and then launching westwards 
into South Beveland.
On 20 October, 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade Group and 
10th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group launched from their start 
lines near Camp de Brasschaet and Maria ter Heide. Although their 
advance was slow, more due to mines, obstacles, and booby traps 
than enemy contact, initial gains reduced 2nd Canadian Division’s 
extended right flank and elements of the two divisions managed 
to link up in Vossenburg.64 The following day, both brigade groups 
advanced to the Roosendaal Canal, and despite heavy resistance 
at times, penetrated deep into 346th Division’s lines. Brigadier R. 
Moncel’s forces even managed to deploy infantry units across the 
64  I British Corps, War Diary, 20 October 1944.
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canal to establish a bridgehead while his armour provided left flank 
security. At the same time, Clarke Force pushed 711th Division out 
of Wuestwezel, causing the previously discussed threat to LXVII 
Corps’ centre.
By the early morning of 22 October, Esschen was captured by 
Brigadier J.C. Jefferson’s Brigade Group, allowing the division to 
eliminate pockets of bypassed enemy in their rear areas. Over 450 
Germans surrendered, leading the war diarist to surmise, “their tails 
are up.”65 Meanwhile, Clarke Force had defeated the attack by 245th 
Division, pushing them north between Zundert and Wuestwezel. 
Although I British Corps achieved considerable success to this point, 
LXVII Corps still exerted considerable influence in the area. 70th 
Division threatened 2nd Canadian Division from the isthmus and 
85th Division and 346th Division still occupied their northern and 
eastern flank. 
The continued push towards Esschen and later Bergen Op Zoom 
had a decisive impact on 2nd Canadian Division and the German 
units opposing them. Elements of 6th Parachute Regiment and self-
propelled guns from 85th Division redeployed from the Woensdrecht 
area to support 346th Division’s attempts to halt 4th Canadian 
Armoured Division’s advance. Despite weakening the forces facing 
2nd Canadian Division, the threat posed by 4th Canadian Armoured 
Division’s advance left von Zangen with few options. As he lacked 
an operational reserve he could only move units from other parts of 
Fifteenth Army’s defensive line. Another key indication of the effect 
of Foster’s attack was the redeployment of German artillery into two 
central locations on the Canadian frontage.66 While German artillery 
continued to engage 2nd Canadian Division, it was now also tasked 
to fire missions to counter the advance of 4th Canadian Armoured 
Division. Obviously this meant that German units facing Keefler’s 
division lost a measure of their fire support capability. At this point, 
the German commanders likely feared imminent encirclement by 2nd 
Canadian and 4th Canadian Armoured Divisions.
Despite this early success, 2nd Canadian Division’s intelligence 
reported, “any assessment of str[ength] on our immediate front 
65  4th Canadian Armoured Division, General Staff War Diary, 22 October 1944.
66  2nd Canadian Infantry Division, General Staff War Diary, August-November 
1944, 2nd Canadian Infantry Division Intelligence Report, 22 October 1944, DND 
Fonds, RG24, C17, volume 13 751, LAC.
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facing north is difficult and unreliable.”67 Further, their intelligence 
assessed, “The enemy intends to hold firmly where he stands and will 
oppose at any cost every effort made by us to seal off completely the 
South Beveland isthmus.”68 Even with elements of 85th and 346th 
Divisions, and the entire 245th Division being drawn away from 2nd 
Canadian Division by I British Corps, lacked the combat power to 
independently isolate the isthmus. Keefler needed Foster to position 
4th Canadian Division between him and LXVII Corps forces to 
protect his rear and flank areas as he attacked west.
On the night of 22 October, Moncel and Foster planned to exploit 
the Division’s success in Esschen by advancing northwest towards 
Bergen Op Zoom. With this action, they hoped that they would 
finally force both Chill and Diestel to either fight to the bitter end 
encircled by Canadians, or withdraw north, ceding the isthmus to 
the Canadians. Neither option was likely acceptable to Sponheimer or 
von Zangen, but they were quickly running out of time and options. 
Advancing northwest on 23 to 24 October, Moncel’s Brigade 
Group ran into Chill’s forces on the Wouwsche Plantage. While Chill 
had been focused on 2nd Canadian Division, Moncel’s advance on his 
left flank once again forced him to reorient part of his forces to face 
the impending threat. The continual sapping of German forces from 
their positions in the Woensdrecht area by 4th Canadian Armoured 
Division allowed Keefler to expand and solidify his position on the 
isthmus.69 Despite inflicting heavy casualties on Chill’s forces, 4th 
Canadian Armoured Brigade Group failed to eject them from the 
Wouwsche Plantage.70 While nominally a setback, it still diverted 
Chill’s operational focus from 2nd Canadian Division. To increase 
the pressure on Chill’s forces, Jefferson’s Brigade Group attacked 
from Huijbergen on 25 October, having captured the town in a joint 
effort with 2nd Canadian Division and 29th Canadian Armoured 
Reconnaissance Regiment the day prior.
Heavy fighting continued on 26 October, but the following 
day Moncel’s Brigade Group ejected the 85th Division from the 
Wouwsche Plantage and advanced further north to Wouwsche 
67  2nd Canadian Infantry Division, General Staff War Diary, 2nd Cdn. Inf. Div. Int. 
Summary No. 14 for the period of 222400AOct44.
68  Ibid.
69  2nd Canadian Infantry Division, General Staff War Diary, War Diary, 24 October 
1944.
70  Warning, Battles of 67 German Corps, 32.
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Hil. For Jefferson’s part, as he advanced west towards Bergen Op 
Zoom, German resistance dissolved as the 85th and 346th Divisions 
withdrew north to escape encirclement. Von Zangen decided to save 
what he could of Fifteenth Army instead of sacrificing them in the 
Scheldt. Late in the day, 29th Canadian Armoured Reconnaissance 
Regiment reported Bergen Op Zoom clear of German forces. At this 
point, the South Beveland isthmus could now be deemed secured by 
both 2nd Canadian Division and 4th Canadian Armoured Division. 
When I British Corps’ operational success is put into the context 
of 2nd Canadian Division’s and First Canadian Army’s operations, 
it is evident that they were much more than a supporting operation. 
The earliest example of this was I British Corps’ ability to draw 
245th Division away from its intended task. Clarke Force’s successful 
occupation of Wuestwezel prevented the reinforcement of 85th and 
346th Divisions in the Woensdrecht area. This enabled 2nd Canadian 
Division to retain and expand its footprint on the isthmus. Had 
245th Division successfully reinforced the German forces facing 2nd 
Canadian Division, it may have resulted in their decisive defeat and 
potential destruction. This suggests a linkage between the operational 
success of I British Corps and 2nd Canadian Division.
Similarly with Bergen Op Zoom captured, 4th Canadian 
Division interposed itself between Keefler’s forces and Sponheimer’s 
divisions, effectively securing their eastern and northern flanks. The 
elimination of this threat enabled 2nd Canadian Division to reorient 
their brigades west and advance into South Beveland. A better way 
to define this action is as a cordon operation. While 2nd Canadian 
Division may have formed the inner cordon on the South Beveland 
isthmus, 4th Canadian Armoured Division and I British Corps 
provided the solid outer cordon that pushed back and defeated the 
external threat. In essence, the efforts to secure the South Beveland 
isthmus became a joint operation between the two divisions, not 4th 
Canadian Armoured Division or I British Corps in a supporting role. 
Again, this is a clear indication of I British Corps directly influencing 
2nd Canadian Division’s ability to execute its operational tasks. 
Surprisingly, this reliance on 4th Canadian Armoured Division 
has been recounted as a failure by 2nd Canadian Division in the 
official history. Stacey states, “Anticipating relief from embarrassment 
on its right by the advance of the 1st Corps under Montgomery’s new 
policy, the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division was able on 23 October 
to begin the final clearing of the Woensdrecht area preparatory to 
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operations against South Beveland.”71 The evidence does not support 
Stacey’s assessment. The division fought a difficult and bloody 
battle, with little support, from the Antwerp-Turnhout Canal to the 
South Beveland isthmus. In the process of fighting elements of three 
separate divisions and an alleged “elite” parachute regiment, they 
suffered heavy casualties, particularly amongst the division’s officers 
and senior non-commissioned officers. A more accurate account of 
2nd Canadian Division’s performance comes from von der Heydte: 
“The Canadians—I say that as a German—fought brilliantly: to the 
rank of Brigadier, the officers stood side by side with their men on the 
front lines.”72 If anything, their inability to secure their objective was 
a reflection of the tactical and operational reality of Montgomery’s 
disconnected pre-16 October strategy. That being said, without 
I British Corps, 2nd Canadian Division would have continued to 
exhaust itself in attempts to accomplish an impossible task.
Operationally, the isolation of the South Beveland isthmus was 
one of First Canadian Army’s preconditions to executing Operations 
Vitality and Infatuate. Thus, the operations of I British Corps between 
20 to 26 October can be directly linked to Allied strategic success. 
By securing 2nd Canadian Division’s eastern and northern flanks, I 
British Corps set into motion a series of operational actions that led 
to the opening of the port of Antwerp. With Simonds’ precondition of 
securing the South Beveland isthmus met, he was able to launch both 
2nd Canadian Division and 52nd (L) Division into South Beveland 
to execute Operation Vitality. Once complete, 4th Special Service 
Brigade executed Operation Infatuate onto Walcheren Island. The 
end result of these operations is well-known and led to the liberation 
of the Scheldt Estuary from German control. What is not recognized 
is that the successful realization of Allied strategy hinged on, and 
was made possible by, the actions of I British Corps.   
Friendly casualty rates are a strong indicator of the determination 
of an enemy in defensive operations. High casualty rates tend indicate 
a well-led and determined enemy, while low casualty rates normally 
are indicative of the opposite. In the weeks leading up to I British 
Corps’ advance to the Maas, 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions suffered 
crippling casualties during their operations to the South Beveland 
71  Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 391.
72  Colonel F. von der Heydte, cited in Terry Copp, The Brigade: The Fifth Canadian 
Infantry Brigade, 1939-1945 (Willowdale, ON: John Deyell Co. Ltd., 1992), 142-143. 
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isthmus and in the Breskens Pocket respectively. Between 2 to 19 
October, 2nd Canadian Division suffered 1,460 killed and wounded 
with an average of 81.1 casualties per day.73 3rd Canadian Division, 
arriving at the Breskens Pocket on 6 October, fared no better and 
suffered 1,213 killed and wounded between 6 to 19 October. This 
equated to an average rate of 86.6 casualties per day.74 
However, these statistics need to be put into context in order 
to understand why they were so high. As 2nd Canadian Division 
advanced to the South Beveland isthmus, they did so without 
the benefit of support from II Canadian or I British Corps. As a 
result, the division found itself fighting elements of three German 
divisions focused exclusively on its destruction. However, as 4th 
Canadian Armoured Division advanced along its right flank, their 
daily casualty rate dropped by 34 per cent to 53.67 casualties per 
day.75 This suggests that 2nd Canadian Division’s daily casualty rate 
between 2 to 19 October would have been lower had I British Corps 
advance in a mutually supporting role during this period.
Within the Breskens Pocket, 3rd Canadian Division fought in 
restrictive terrain, which greatly facilitated German defensive operations. 
In fact, during the period of 6 to 19 October, 3rd Canadian Division 
suffered 65.5 per cent of their casualties in a six-day window during 
its assault across the Leopold Canal and the amphibious operation 
at Braakman.76 The daily casualty rate during this period was 132.5 
compared to 52.25 during the remaining eight days.77 While German 
forces within the Breskens Pocket have long been considered to have 
mounted a formidable defence, these numbers suggest that terrain was 
a determinant factor in their ability to defend within the pocket.
Undoubtedly, 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions faced a determined 
and motivated enemy, but how do I British Corps casualty statistics 
compare? Did I British Corps face a defeated enemy racing to cross the 
Maas to safety or an enemy determined to delay and fix them as long 
as possible? 4th Canadian Armoured Division’s war diary certainly 
indicates that it faced strong German resistance during their advance 
73  First Canadian Army, Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General War Diary, 
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to the Maas. Similarly, Stacey, Ellis, and MacDonald provide several 
examples of fierce combat in their respective official histories.
Casualty statistics support these claims. During the period 
of 20 October to 8 November, three of the four divisions within I 
British Corps suffered higher casualties than 2nd and 3rd Canadian 
Divisions. In particular, 104th (US) Infantry Division averaged 77.25 
casualties per day after it entered the line on 23 October.78 In total, 
they suffered 1,236 killed or wounded, which was over 400 more 
casualties than 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions. Although reports 
indicate a determined German opposition, the higher casualty rates 
within 104th (US) Infantry Division may also have been due to the 
manner in which Allen fought his division. Regardless, both 4th 
Canadian Armoured Division and 49th (WR) Division have slightly 
higher casualty rates than 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions.
Brigade casualties follow the same trend as their higher 
headquarters. I British Corps brigades had the highest four casualty 
rates within First Canadian Army during this period. Indicative of 
the determined resistance faced by 4th Canadian Armoured Division, 
10th Canadian Infantry Brigade suffered the highest daily casualty 
rate within the corps, with an average of 26.9. This totalled 538 
killed or wounded, which was more than double the total of five of 
the six infantry brigades within 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions.79 
Both division and brigade statistics suggest that as I British Corps 
advanced to the Maas, it fought an enemy that was as or more 
determined than the German forces facing 2nd and 3rd Canadian 
Divisions. It is unlikely that Fifteenth Army would have withdrawn 
across the Maas had Crocker’s forces not executed a determined and 
decisive assault. It is clear that the operations of I British Corps in 
October and November 1944 were a critical part of the operational 
and strategic success of II Canadian Corps, First Canadian Army, 
Twenty-First Army Group, and possibly the Allied war effort.
This paper has demonstrated that I British Corps’ operations 
were critical to the operational and strategic success of Allied 
operations to open the port of Antwerp. As Crocker’s forces began 
their advance, they represented an existential threat to LXVII Corps 
78  Ibid.; First Canadian Army, Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General 
War Diary, November-December 1944, Consolidated C and S state, 1-8 
November 1944.  
79  Ibid. 
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and Fifteenth Army as a whole. Recognizing this, von Zangen was 
forced to redeploy and maintain forces within I British Corps’ area 
of operations to prevent the collapse of his army’s defensive line. As 
Crocker fixed formations on his front, it prevented the much needed 
reinforcement of German forces facing 2nd Canadian Division and 
XII British Corps, thus undermining von Zangen’s strategic plan to 
retain the South Beveland isthmus and deny the port of Antwerp 
to the Allies. Clearly, Crocker’s actions undermined von Zangen’s 
and the German Army’s ability to achieve operational and strategic 
success.
As 4th Canadian Armoured Division and Clarke Force secured 
the northern and eastern flank of 2nd Canadian Division, it enabled 
the execution of First Canadian Army’s plan to clear the Scheldt 
and eventually open Antwerp as a logistical hub for the Allied forces. 
Operational success on the part of I British Corps was directly 
responsible for the operational success of II Canadian Corps and 
the strategic victory of First Canadian Army. Without I British 
Corps successfully completing its operational tasks, the clearance of 
the Scheldt Estuary and the opening of the port of Antwerp would 
have been considerably delayed. Regardless of I British Corps’ status 
within the historiography of the Battle of the Scheldt, Crocker, and 
the action of his forces, deserve to be recognized for the decisive 
victory they achieved in October and November of 1944.
◆     ◆     ◆     ◆
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